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Abstract 
On October 14, 2008, Hong Kong’s financial secretary announced the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA) would use Hong Kong’s Exchange Fund to provide standby capital to 
banks if needed. The Contingent Bank Capital Facility (CBCF) was available until the end of 
2010 to shore up depositor and investor confidence in the local banking sector and 
commenced in parallel with a broader set of announced measures including a consumer 
bank deposit guarantee. Twenty-three locally incorporated “Authorized Institutions” were 
eligible to access CBCF capital upon request. The provisioning of CBCF capital would be 
accompanied by enhanced oversight from the HKMA. The Hong Kong government did not 
formalize the structure or terms of CBCF capital, nor did it expressly define any limits for 
individual banks or in aggregate. The CBCF never injected any capital and expired as 
initially scheduled, at the end of 2010. 
Keywords: broad-based, capital injections, broad-based capital injections, Contingent Bank 
Capital Facility, Exchange Fund, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
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At a Glance  
Around the peak of the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) in October 2008, Hong Kong’s 
domestic banking sector remained in 
relatively strong shape. Hong Kong’s local 
banks collectively had a regulatory capital 
ratio of 14%, which was well over the 8% of 
risk-weighted assets that the Basel II 
international standards prescribed (HKMA 
2008a, 2). However, in keeping with its 
international counterparts and responding 
to growing domestic financial disturbance, 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) 
implemented a capital injection facility. In 
addition to a temporary expansion of 
deposit insurance and several previously 
announced liquidity provisions, the 
financial secretary announced on October 
14, 2008 that the HKMA would use the 
Exchange Fund (the Fund) to provide 
standby capital to banks. Under a program 
known as the Contingent Bank Capital 
Facility (CBCF), locally incorporated 
“Authorized Institutions” could request 
capital on an as-needed basis. The HKMA 
did not formalize the structure or terms of 
CBCF capital injections, nor did it make 
explicit any maximum investment figure—
either on a per-bank basis or in aggregate. 
As the HKMA predicted, the CBCF was 
never accessed. The program was allowed 
to expire as planned at the end of 2010. 
Summary Evaluation 
Because no CBCF capital was ever deployed, 
there are no specific instances of execution 
from which to draw an evaluation. 
However, the HKMA consistently described the CBCF as preemptory and intended to ward 
off the risk of the Hong Kong banking system becoming undercapitalized, even if the odds 
of such risk were remote (HKMA 2008a, 3; Wong and Tang 2008). In this respect, the lack 
of usage is consistent with success. In December 2008, the International Monetary Fund 
executive board stated it considered the CBCF to be “timely and warranted” (IMF 2008). 
However, the effects that CBCF may have had cannot be clearly separated from those of the 
other contemporaneous local and global responses. 
 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To support stability and confidence in the 
Hong Kong banking system by “making available 
additional capital to locally incorporated licensed 
banks, on request and subject to supervisory 
scrutiny should this become necessary” (FS 2008) 
Launch Dates Announcement: October 14, 
2008 
Operational: October 14, 
2008  
Wind-Down Dates December 31, 2010 (HKMA 
2010) 
Program Size Not specified. The limit was 
the total size of the Exchange 
Fund, inclusive of its 
borrowing limit 
Usage None (HKMA 2010) 
Outcomes No uptake 
Ownership Structure Government-owned 
Notable Features The design of the capital 
injections was not broadly 
established; instead, 
investment terms were to be 
set on a bank-by-bank basis 
(HKMA 2008a, 3) 
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Hong Kong Context: 2007–2008 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$211.6 billion in 2007 
$219.1 billion in 2008 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$30,594 in 2007 
$31,516 in 2008 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt) 
 









Size of banking system 
$305.3 billion in total assets in 2007 
$330.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
144.3% in 2007 
150.6% in 2008 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
Data not available for Hong Kong 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
77.7% of total banking assets in 2007 
79.5% of total banking assets in 2008 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
91% of total banking assets in 2007 
91% of total banking assets in 2008 
Government ownership of banking system 
0% of banks owned by the state in 
2007 
0% of banks owned by the state in 
2008 
Existence of deposit insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to 
$64,500 in 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to 
$64,500 in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg, World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database, World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: Hong Kong’s financial secretary announced the Contingent 
Bank Capital Facility alongside a broad deposit guarantee scheme.  
The Contingent Bank Capital Facility shared a press release with the new expansion of 
deposit guarantees (FS 2008), and its establishment also followed several weeks of newly 
implemented HKMA liquidity measures (HKMA 2009b). The purpose of the CBCF was to 
provide standby capital to banks during the Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, the CBCF 
came in the middle of a spate of capital injection programs across other developed markets 
(COP 2009, 12).  
2. Legal Authority: The legal authority for the financial secretary to establish the 
CBCF stemmed from the Exchange Fund Ordinance. 
The Exchange Fund Ordinance, originally of 1935, established an Exchange Fund to be 
under the discretion of the financial secretary in consultation with an Exchange Fund 
Advisory Committee. During the Global Financial Crisis, the ordinance’s outlined 
authorities provided the secretary the power to use the Fund’s resources to affect the 
exchange value of the Hong Kong currency and, secondarily, to engage in stabilizing 
transactions that aim to maintain “Hong Kong as an international financial centre” (HKMA 
2008a; LegCo n.d.). In addition to the established funds, the Exchange Fund Ordinance also 
granted the secretary the legal authority to borrow for the Fund up to HKD 50 billion 
(approximately USD 6.5 billion) via sovereign debt issuance, without securing any 
additional authorization (LegCo n.d.). 
3. Communication: The HKMA created the CBCF to provide standby capital to banks 
upon their request, but Chief Executive of the HKMA Joseph Yam described it as a 
precautionary measure and did not expect to use it. 
Chief Executive of the HKMA Joseph Yam generally referred to the CBCF as a precautionary 
measure, enacted in response to adverse foreign developments (FS 2008; Yam 2008b, 12). 
Contemporary media coverage, however, noted that Hong Kong’s Bank of East Asia had 
started to experience a run in the weeks preceding the announcement of the CBCF (Wan 
2008).  
Yam consistently reiterated that the HKMA did not expect banks to use the CBCF, due to the 
perceived strength of the Hong Kong banking sector (FS 2008; HKMA 2008a, 4; Panel 2008, 
11). 
4. Governance/Administration: The HKMA operated the CBCF, and the Exchange 
Fund would have held any CBCF investments, under the discretion of the 
financial secretary. 
Given the limited outlines of the program itself as well as its lack of uptake, there does not 
seem to have been any material discussion of governance.  
Had any banks utilized the CBCF, requesting banks would have been subject to additional 
monitoring by the HKMA. Borrowing institutions would have been subject to enhanced 
supervisory scrutiny with respect to material deviations in risk, balance sheet structure, or 
business strategy. The HKMA would have required borrowing institutions to notify it 
before beginning or materially expanding a line of business (HKMA 2008b). 
131
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
 
5. Size, Timing, and Source of Injections: The CBCF was available until the end of 
2010 and was backed by the resources of the Exchange Fund. 
The Exchange Fund was the source of funds for the CBCF. While policymakers did not offer 
an explicit monetary figure, the Fund contained approximately HKD 1.4 trillion 
(approximately USD 180 billion) in October 2008 (Wong and Tang 2008; HKMA 2008c). As 
noted in Key Design Decision No. 2 above, the financial secretary could also supplement the 
Fund’s resources with up to HKD 50 billion (about USD 6.5 billion) of sovereign borrowing. 
However, the financial secretary also committed the Fund’s resources to the expanded 
deposit guarantee scheme announced alongside the CBCF (FS 2008). 
6. Eligible Institutions: Only locally incorporated licensed banks were eligible to 
participate in the CBCF.  
This list included 23 Hong Kong banks (HKMA 2009a, 197). Licensed banks were the only 
type of bank allowed to accept consumer deposits less than HKD 100,000 (approximately 
USD 13,000) (HKMA n.d.). Notably, the deposit guarantee scheme announced alongside the 
CBCF expanded deposit insurance to banks outside this “licensed” classification (FS 2008; 
HKDPB n.d.). 
7. Individual Participation Limits: There does not appear to have been any stated 
limit on individual institutions’ participation, given the lack of broadly applied 
terms. 
The only apparent limit on the amount of funding available to an institution seemed to be 
the available amount in the Exchange Fund. 
8. Capital Characteristics: There seems to have been no specifics with regard to the 
terms of the capital investments under the CBCF. 
HKMA would have designed the structure of CBCF investments with consideration for each 
requesting bank’s individual circumstances (HKMA 2008a, 3). Without a stated structure 
design or any ultimate usage of the program, it is not clear what kind of structure the 
HKMA injections would have assumed. 
9. Other Conditions: The HKMA signaled that CBCF capital would come with 
conditions. 
It appears any injections would have come with conditions that encouraged banks to 
replace the Exchange Fund’s investment with private capital (HKMA 2008b). HKMA Chief 
Executive Yam noted that banks would prefer private capital to the CBCF due to the 
enhanced restrictions and supervisory measures that would be attached to that latter (Yam 
2008a). 
10. Exit Strategy: The CBCF closed on December 31, 2010, as originally announced. 
Had the financial secretary made investments under the CBCF, it is not clear how long the 
Exchange Fund would have held onto any shares. 
11. Regulatory Changes: The creation of the CBCF did not include any regulatory 
changes. 
HKMA Chief Executive Yam stated that, alongside the CBCF, the HKMA would adopt a 
“flexible approach to adjusting the ‘premium’ over the statutory capital adequacy ratio” for 
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individual banks, but it is not clear how this flexibility would have interacted with capital 
injections pursuant to the CBCF (Yam 2009, 8).  
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